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Abstract
In the two-country Melitz (2003) model, unilateral trade liberalization is often
cast as a reduction of iceberg transportation costs and wages are determined by
a linear outside sector. We show that welfare results reverse when wages adjust
and trade frictions are revenue-generating tariffs.
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1 Introduction
Melitz & Ottaviano (2008) and Demidova (2008) use variants of the Melitz (2003)
model to show that unilateral trade liberalization–cast as lower iceberg transporta-
tion costs–can be immiserizing. These models use a linear outside sector that pins
down wages. Generalizing Demidova & Rodriguez-Clare (2009, 2011), we use a two-
country framework with fully endogenous wages. Moreover, we contrast iceberg trans-
portation costs (non-tariff import barriers) to revenue-generating tariffs.
In stark contrast to the case of a linear outside good, the model with fully endoge-
nous wages predicts that a unilateral reduction of non-tariff import barriers benefits
both countries. When trade liberalization comes as a unilateral reduction in an ad
valorem import tariff, the liberalizing country typically loses, while the other country
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always gains. Our analysis suggests that the assumption of a linear outside sector–
often made for the sake of convenience–distorts the welfare predictions of the model.




Our setup is a two-country version of Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow & Rodriguez-
Clare (2008), henceforth ADKR, to which we refer for a more detailed explanation
of the model setup.1 The major difference to ADKR is that we allow for revenue-
generating ad valorem tariffs. Home and Foreign, indexed i ∈ {H,F} , are populated
by representative consumers who inelastically supply the only factor of production,
labor, Li at price wi. The consumers have identical standard Dixit-Stiglitz preferences
with a constant elasticity of substitution given by σ > 1.
Firms compete monopolistically. After paying innovation costs wif
e, each draws
its productivity level ϕ from a Pareto distributed c.d.f. G [ϕ] = 1−ϕ−β, where β > σ−1
to guarantee the existence of a well-defined size distribution. Output is linear in ϕ.
Fixed costs of accessing market j are given by wifij, where we set fii = fjj = f
d and
fij = fji = f
x. Country i may levy an ad valorem tariff tij > 1 on its imports or may
impose a non-tariff import barrier τ ij > 1, where tii = tjj = τ ii = τ jj = 1. In line with
the above cited papers, we model non-tariff import barriers as iceberg transportation
costs.
2.2 Equilibrium conditions
The first set of equilibrium conditions is made up of four zero cutoff-profit conditions
(ZCPs). They determine the productivity ϕ∗ij of those firms in country i which just



















is revenue of firm ϕ located in i earned from
sales in j with ρ = (σ − 1) /σ. Ej is aggregate expenditure. The price index Pi is given
by









1In contrast to us, for their purposes, ADKR do not derive the complete comparative statics of their
model.
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is the probability of exporting.
The second set of conditions is made up of two free entry conditions, which make
sure that expected profits equalize the costs of innovation.












These conditions make up a system of eight equations in eight unknown endoge-






FH ;MH ,MF ;wH , wF} .
2.3 Welfare and auxiliary relationships
The variable of interest in this note is the representative agent’s level of welfare. Un-
der the Pareto assumption, we have











In contrast to tariffs, non-tariff barriers appear directly in this expression. To sign
changes of Wi, we need to pin down changes in cutoffs ϕ
∗
ji.








where r̄ij = σθwimijfij denotes average revenues that a firm in i makes on market j.
The second equality in (6) follows balanced trade, Mir̄ij = Mj r̄ji, which is implied by
agents being on their budget constraints.
Finally, different to the case of non-tariff barriers, equilibrium welfare will turn
out to depend on both, the share of revenues earned domestically, αi, and the share














Importantly, α̃i < αi. Without tariffs, α̃i = αi.
3
3 Unilateral trade liberalization
We study the effect of a reduction in a given import tariff tH and of a lower non-tariff
import barrier τH on welfare in Home and Foreign.
2 In contrast to models with a
linear outside sector, Home’s relative wage ω ≡ wH/wF is free to adjust. After char-
acterizing endogenous wage adjustment in the presence of tariff income, we derive
the general equilibrium effects of unilateral trade liberalization on both countries’
welfare.
3.1 Endogenous wage adjustment
To prepare the comparative statics, we totally differentiate the above equations, using
the traditional ‘hat’ notation x̂ ≡ dx/x. Using Home’s import cutoff condition (1)
relative to its domestic cutoff condition, and totally differentiating, one obtains
ρ (ϕ̂∗FH − ϕ̂
∗
HH) + ω̂ = t̂H + ρτ̂H . (8)
Changes in tariffs or transportation costs can be absorbed by adjustment in cutoffs
or the wage rate.
Home’s export cutoff condition relates the change in the wage rate to changes in
its export cutoff and foreign aggregate variables
ω̂ = ρϕ̂∗HF + ρP̂F + (1− ρ) ÊF . (9)
Foreign’s price index can be written in exactly the same variables as (9)
P̂F =
1− α̃F
θ − 1 + α̃F
ϕ̂∗HF −
α̃F




(1− α̃F )(θ − 1)
θ − 1 + α̃F
ω̂, (10)
where Foreign’s domestic entry cutoff condition ϕ̂∗FF = −P̂F − ÊF/ (σ − 1) has been
used. If tariff revenue melts away as in Ossa (2011), a tariff reform has no direct effect
on aggregate income. Then, equation (9) simplifies to ω̂ = β/ (1− α̃F ) ϕ̂
∗
HF . With
tariff revenue, this is no longer true. Differentiating (6) and using balanced trade,
ÊF = −βϕ̂
∗












where the second equality follows from balanced trade, ω̂ − βϕ̂∗HF = −βϕ̂
∗
FH .
Equations (10) and (11) allow to rewrite (9) as a function of Home’s export cutoff
only
ω̂ = ξϕ̂∗HF , where β > ξ ≡
βρ
ρ+ αF (β − ρ)
> ρ. (12)
Hence, if an exogenous change in tH or τH increases ϕ
∗
HF , Home’s wage relative to
Foreign’s must go up.
2Whenever convenient, we write tH and τH for tHF and τHF.
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3.2 Welfare effects
Using (12), balanced trade, and the totally differentiated free entry condition ϕ̂∗ii =
− (1− αi) ϕ̂
∗


















Since balanced trade together with (12) implies a positive link between both export
(import) cutoffs, ϕ̂∗HF = βϕ̂
∗
FH/ (β − ξ) , Foreign’s import cutoff goes up, too. By free
entry, domestic cutoffs move in the opposite directions.
Totally differentiating (5), using the labor market clearing conditions to replace
Mj and the free entry conditions to substitute out ϕ
∗










ϕ̂∗HF − (1− α̃i) ρτ̂ ij, (14)
where AH = 1 − α̃H > 0 and AF = − (1− aF ) α̃F/aF < 0. In contrast to tariffs, τH
directly appears in Home’s utility function (5) due to its resource saving effect.
Let τ̂H = 0 and consider a tariff reform. If initially tH = 1, αH − α̃H = 0. Hence,
ŴH/t̂H > 0 for a ‘small’ tariff (either revenue-generating or ‘wasteful’).
3 In contrast,
we always have ŴF/t̂H < 0.
Now, fix tH = 1 and consider a unilateral liberalization of Home’s non-tariff import
barriers. τH has no direct effect on WF . Noting ϕ̂
∗
FH/τ̂H > 0 and the positive link
between both export cutoffs implied by balanced trade, we have ŴF/τ̂H < 0. Using
the same relationships and AH = 1 − α̃H in ŴH , one obtains ŴH/τ̂H < 0. The result
follows from (β − ρ)κξ/ (β − ξ) = [1 + βρ/αH (β − ρ)]
−1 < 1.
We may summarize:
Proposition 1 In a two-country Melitz (2003) model with Pareto-distributed produc-
tivities, unilateral liberalization of a ‘small’ ad valorem import tariff lowers welfare
of the liberalizing country and raises welfare of its trading partner, while a unilateral
reduction of non-tariff import barriers always benefits both countries.
So, lower non-tariff import barriers do not immiserize the liberalizing country or
its trade partner.4 This is in contrast to Demidova (2008) or Melitz & Ottaviano (2008)
where wages are technologically fixed. A unilateral reduction of the tariff can hurt the
3Our analysis shows that there exists a finite positive tariff in a one-sector Melitz (2003) model.
This generalizes Demidova & Rodriguez-Clare (2009) who study the small economy case. It also sum-
marizes Ossa (2011) who studies a wasteful tariff in a model with a linear outside sector.
4Demidova & Rodríguez-Clare (2011) have already shown the welfare effects for Home, albeit in a
setup without tariffs; the proof for Foreign is new.
5
liberalizing country.5 In Ossa’s (2011) model, due to the linear outside sector, without
modeling tariff income, unilateral reduction of tariffs always lowers Home’s welfare.
Finally, note that our results qualitatively carry over to the Krugman (1980) model
which is nested by our setup for β → σ − 1.6
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